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THE APPLICATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
LEGISLATION TO AVIATION LITIGATION
WILLIAM L. MAYNARD*
INTRODUCTION
A LTHOUGH numerous statutes, both state and federal, have
been enacted to provide additional protection to dissatisfied
and injured consumers, there is a dearth of litigation under these
statutes in the area of aviation litigation. The language of some
of this consumer protection legislation, however, is sufficiently
broad to provide additional protection for general aviation air-
craft purchasers, insurance policyholders, and airline passengers.
Therefore, these statutes ultimately may have a direct bearing on
a substantial area of aviation litigation. In order to demonstrate
the potential applicability of these statutes to aviation litigation,
this paper will provide an overview of the basic types of state con-
sumer protection statutes, interpretations! of the Federal Trade
Commission Act relevant to state consumer protection statutes,
the Magnuson-Moss Act, and selected state statutes which permit
private actions.
THE BASIC TYPES OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES
Many states have enacted various kinds of statutes which at-
tempt to protect consumers by proscribing "unfair or deceptive
trade practices."' All of these statutes, however, can be readily
*William L. Maynard received his J.D. in 1973, summa cum laude, from
the University of Houston, where he received his B.A. degree in 1970. He is a
partner in the law firm of Payne, Gilpin, Maynard and Parsons in Houston,
Texas, where he specializes in aviation litigation.
'Comment, Nontraditional Remedies for the Settlement of Consumer Dis-
putes, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 385, 408 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Nontraditional Reme-
dies]; Gold & Cohan, State Protection of the Consumer: Integration of Civil and
Criminal Remedies, 12 N. ENG. L. REV. 933, 934 (1977).
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classified as being one of three basic types of state consumer pro-
tection legislation: "little FTC acts," consumer fraud acts, and
deceptive trade practice acts.' Each type seeks to protect con-
sumers from deceptive practices. They differ, however, in the
means each uses to accomplish this goal.
The "little FTC acts" are patterned after section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA)2 and proscribe "unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive practices" which
are prohibited in interstate commerce by the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC).' These statutes, like the FTCA itself, incorporate
broad definitions of deceptive trade practices.' In contrast, con-
sumer fraud acts are designed to prevent fraudulent and deceptive
selling practices, and concentrate on consumer matters instead of
unfair methods of competition.! A third type of consumer protec-
tion legislation-a variation on the Uniform Deceptive Trade Prac-
'Nontraditional Remedies, supra note 1, at 408.
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976).
4 Nontraditional Remedies, supra note 1, at 409. Massachusetts, Vermont,
Washington, and Louisiana are examples of states adopting "little FTC acts." Id.
5 Id. Less than half of those states which have enacted "little FTC acts" im-
pose civil penalties for initial violations. Gold & Cohan, supra note 1, at 934;
see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.551 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-I10o(b)
(West 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 106-1215 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480.3.1
(1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 267 (Smith-Hurd 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-636 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 367.990 (1978); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN.
S 13-410 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.8018(1) (1971) (restraint of trade);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-19 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1614 (1978); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A: 4 111(b) (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-13 (1971);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-11 (1978); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-C (McKinney
1963) (false advertising only); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.642 (1977); S.C. CODE §
39-5-110 (1977); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 37-24-27 (1977); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE § 17.47(c) (Vernon 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2458(b)(1) (1972);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.140 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 46A-7-111 (1976);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100 (26)(6) (West 1973) (unfair collection practices); V.I.
CODE tit. 12A, § 104 (Supp. 1978). Statutory citations derived from Gold &
Cohan, supra note 1, at 936 n.13. Varying burdens of proof are imposed. Of
those states which impose civil penalties for initial violations, twelve require
proof that the violation was willful, intentional, or knowing: Arizona, Connecticut,
Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia. Id. at 937 n.18, and accompanying text.
Fifteen states require no showing of intent: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Illinois,
Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Texas, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin. Id. at 937 n.19, and accompany-
ing text.
6 Nontraditional Remedies, supra note 1, at 409. Examples of such laws may
be found in New Jersey, Illinois and Arizona. Id.
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tices Act (UDTPA)' -has been adopted by a great number of
states. The UDTPA lists twelve specific acts which are prohibited,8
instead of utilizing the broad definitions of deceptive trade prac-
tices found in both consumer fraud acts and "little FTC acts."
Some states which have adopted the UDTPA have also added pro-
visions which generally proscribe "any other act or practice which
is unfair or deceptive to the consumer."'
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
Many state consumer protection statutes, require state courts to
look to interpretations of the FTCA by the Federal Trade Com-
7ld.
8 Id. at 409-10. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act S 2 makes un-
lawful:
(1) passing off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to
source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services;
(3) causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to
affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, an-
other;
(4) using deceptive representations or designs of geographic origin
in connection with goods or services;
(5) representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval,
characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do
not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiilia-
tion or connection that he does not have;
(6) representing that goods are original or new if they are de-
teriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used or secondhand;
(7) representing that goods or services are of a particular standard,
quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model,
if they are of another;
(8) disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by
false or misleading representations of fact;
(9) advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as
advertised;
(10) advertising goods or services with intent not to supply rea-
sonable expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses
a limitation of quantity;
(11) making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the
reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions;
(12) engaging in any other conduct which similarly creates a like-
lihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.
Nontraditional Remedies, supra note I, at 409-10, n.159. Several states have
followed the approach of the UDTPA: ALASKA STAT. S 45.50.471 (Supp. 1975);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, S 2532 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.772 (West. Supp.
1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5 (Supp. 1975); NEv. REV. STAT. § 598.410
(1975); Tnx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon Supp. 1980); Wyo. STAT.
5 40-12-105 (1977).
9 Nontraditional Remedies, supra note 1, at 410.
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mission and the federal courts for guidance in determining what
constitutes a deceptive act or practice. The Texas statute, for
example, which allows a consumer to bring an action for "[f]alse,
misleading or deceptive acts or practices"". requires the Texas
courts to define such terms with reference to the interpretations of
the FTCA by the Federal Trade Commission and federal courts."
These interpretations have created a substantial body of "deceptive
practices law" which contains general principles that could easily
make some state consumer protection legislation applicable to
aviation litigation.
An act or practice is "false, misleading or deceptive," under
"deceptive practices law," if it has the capacity or tendency to
deceive; actual deception is not required." In determining capacity
or tendency to deceive, consideration is given to the impact of
the representation on the "ignorant, the unthinking, and the
credulous."'" An advertisement containing the literal truth may be
deceptive if consumers could misinterpret its meaning. 5 The test
is whether the advertisement, as a whole, is misleading or decep-
tive, even though the literal truth may be disclosed.' For example,
ambiguous advertising which implies two meanings, one of which
is correct and the other of which is false, is considered deceptive.'
The materiality of the misrepresentation, while recognized as a
factor," is of no real consequence. The consumer is entitled to
the truth, even if it would only be of value in making an irrational
buying decision." Intent to deceive, which is historically an ele-
"'See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.204(2) (1973); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.46(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
"I TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
"2ld. § 17.46(c)(1)(a).
" See, e.g., FTC v. Hires Turner Glass Co., 81 F.2d 362, 364 (3d Cir. 1935).
1' Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir.
1944) citing Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Doud & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910);
Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978). See Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC,
150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1944).
" See, e.g., Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956).
"i Id.
"7See, e.g., Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956); Charles
of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944).
"8See, e.g., Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942);
Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1005,
1056 (1967).
"9FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).
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ment of common law fraud," is totally irrelevant." It is immaterial
if the speaker does not have knowledge of the misrepresentation
or knowledge of the advertisement's falsity."
It is clear that any express falsehood will be deceptive.'3 In
many situations, however, the deception can be more subtle, as
where one statement in a sales pitch or advertisement is untrue or
deceptive, while other statements therein attempt to "clarify" the
untrue or deceptive one. The rule in "deceptive practices law" is
that a violation of law occurs if a sales pitch or advertisement taken
as a whole has the capacity or tendency to deceive.' If a state-
ment that purports to qualify or "defalsify" the deceptive state-
ment is not as conspicuous or as fully emphasized as the deceptive
statement, then a violation of law likely will be found." As stated
by the United States Supreme Court in Donaldson v. Read Maga-
zine, Inc.,6 deception can occur "because things are omitted that
should be said, or because advertisements are composed or pur-
posefully printed in such a way as to mislead."'
"See, e.g., Wilson v. Jones, 45 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932,
holding approved); Bondies v. Glenn, 119 S.W.2d 1095, 1098 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1938, writ dism'd); Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Neal, 119
S.W.2d 1077, 1079-80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1938, writ ref'd). In Texas,
intent to deceive, or knowledge that a representation is false, while not an
essential element of fraud, must be shown in order to recover exemplary dam-
ages. Success Motivation Inst., Inc. v. Lawlis, 503 S.W.2d 864, 870 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
"1FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934); Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967) ("whatever Ward's intentions
were in the advertising, they are not controlling"); Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. FTC,
116 F.2d 578, 579 (2d Cir. 1941) ("a deliberate effort to deceive is not neces-
sary").
"See, e.g., D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942).
23See, e.g., FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934) (composition of
product misstated); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933) (seller not
"manufacturer"); In re Perfect Mfg. Co., 43 F.T.C. 238 (1948) (goods not
"fireproof").
'See, e.g., Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1969); Murray
Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1962); Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v.
FTC, 266 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959); Bamest, The Law of Trade Practices-l,
False Advertising, 23 Omo ST. L.J. 596, 640 (1962).
"Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 977, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. dis-
missed, 376 U.S. 967 (1964) (qualifying statement too remote from and less
conspicuous than deceptive one); Metal Stamping Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
33 F.2d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 1929).
26 333 U.S. 178, 188 (1948).
27 Id.
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Silence is not golden, because "[t]o tell less than the whole
truth is a well-known method of deception.""8 Clearly, there is a
duty to disclose facts which would cure a misapprehension that
could result from statements which are made."' It has also been
held that a duty exists to disclose a product's composition if it
has been changed or is different than what it appears to be,"' to
disclose a danger that might result from use of the product," and
to disclose any prior use of a product.'
The ramifications of extending these general principles of "de-
ceptive practices law" to air crash litigation should be apparent.
For example, a state's consumer protection statute allowing a
private action for damages might be applied to the sale of a typical
four-passenger single-engine aircraft which later crashes, causing
injuries to the consumer. Assume that the manufacturer had pre-
viously litigated and lost a crashworthiness case involving the
same model aircraft. An allegation that the manufacturer knew of
the dangers of enhanced injuries associated with an accident might
make evidence of the prior accident and litigation admissible.
Moreover, the manufacturer's failure to disclose the known danger
might be considered a deceptive trade practice giving rise to
remedies made available under that state's consumer protection
statute.
Interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act by the
FTC and the federal courts also eliminate many of the defenses
historically available to defendants in fraud cases. A plaintiff in
most cases will no longer be able to defend by alleging that the
defendant did not rely on his misrepresentation. Federal courts
construing the FTCA have consistently held that the standard for
judging deceptive trade practices is not actual deception, but
whether the practice has the capacity to deceive."M Therefore, since
28 P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950). See also Benrus
Watch Co. v. FIC, 352 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1965).
2See Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 43 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950).
3' Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 218 F. 744, 753 (2d Cir. 1922).
-1 Benrus Watch Co. v. FT7C, 352 F.2d 313, 323 (8th Cir. 1965); Theodore
Kagen Corp. v. FTC, 283 F.2d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
1 American Medicinal Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 136 F.2d 426, 427 (9th Cir. 1943).
33Double Eagle Lubricants, Inc. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 268, 269 (10th Cir. 1965).
"Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 604 (9th Cir. 1967).
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actual deception is not required, it seems logical to conclude that
there need be no showing that anyone relied upon the misrepre-
sentation. A Massachusetts court,' interpreting that state's con-
sumer protection statute with reference to "deceptive practices
law," has held:
As numerous FTC cases made clear, the definition of an action-
able "unfair or deceptive act or practice" goes far beyond the
scope of the common law action for fraud and deceit. To cite
only a few distinctions, in the statutory action proof of actual
reliance by the plaintiff on a representation is not required ...
[A claim] is not subject to the traditional limitations of preexisting
causes of action such as tort for fraud and deceit.'
The "capacity to deceive" test has been acknowledged in a similar
fashion by Texas courts interpreting that state's consumer protec-
tion statute."7 Submissions of the reliance issue, however, have
been mentioned without disapproval in other such cases in that
state."8
In common law fraud, the "puffing" rule allowed a seller to
misstate nonspecific facts "on the theory that no reasonable man
would believe him, or that no reasonable man would be influenced
by such talk."'" Under "deceptive practices law," however, the
standard is not that of the reasonable man; it is that of the "ignor-
ant, the unthinking, and the credulous."* For example, the FTC's
view of "puffing" 1 is very narrow:
Puffing, as we understand it, is a term frequently used to denote
exaggerations reasonably to be expected of a seller as to the
degree of quality of his product, the truth or falsity of which
cannot be precisely determined. In contrast thereto, the represen-
tation as to "the world's lowest price" is a statement of an objec-
ISlaney v. Westwood Auto Co., 322 N.E.2d 768 (Mass. 1975).
"Id. at 779.
37 See, e.g., Wesware, Inc. v. State, 488 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1972, no writ).
'See, e.g., Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978); Singleton v.
Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
'"W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 723 (4th ed. 1971); see Saunders
v. Martin, 390 S.W.2d 513, 515-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1965, no writ);
25 Tax. JuR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 47 (1961).
4'FrC v. Hires Turner Glass Co., 81 F.2d 362, 364 (3d Cir. 1935).
'In re Better Living, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 648 (1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 271 (3d
Cir. 1958).
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tive actuality, the truth or falsity of which is not variable and can
be ascertained with factual precision. This representation cannot,
therefore, properly be termed "puffing." It is either true, or it is
false.'
Where deceptive trade practices are committed within the ap-
parent scope of the authority of an agent, "deceptive practices
law" has held that the principal is liable even though the conduct
was not authorized or was even prohibited by the principal. 3
Similarly, a person who places in the hands of another a means
of consummating a deceptive trade practice is himself liable."
Likewise, those persons who either own or control a corporation
have been held personally liable for the deceptive trade practices
committed by the corporation through its agents.43
"Deceptive practices law" also indicates that breach of warranty
may constitute a deceptive practice. For example, assume that a
consumer purchases a typical four-passenger aircraft for personal
use which, for no apparent reason, comes apart in flight, causing
injuries to the consumer. Assume further that the manufacturer
had previously litigated and lost a claim involving similar facts,
under allegations of defective design and breach of the implied
warranty that the plane was reasonably fit for flight. In addition
to providing grounds for an allegation that the manufacturer failed
to disclose a known danger, these facts also appear to support a
claim for breach of the implied warranty that the plane was rea-
sonably fit for its ordinary usage. Under the FTC decisions, failure
41 Id. at 653.
"'See Shafe v. FTC, 256 F.2d 661, 664 (6th Cir. 1958); Goodman v. FTC,
244 F.2d 584, 594 (9th Cir. 1957); Standard Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d
7, 11 (2d Cir. 1954); Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 437, 440
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 753-54 (1944); Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121
F.2d 282, 284 (6th Cir. 1941); In re Star Office Supply Co., 77 F.T.C. 383, 444
(1970).
"See FTC v. Winstead Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922); Rayex
Corp. v. FTC, 317 F.2d 290, 292 (2d Cir. 1963); C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v.
FTC, 197 F.2d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 1952).
4FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 120 (1937); Standard Educa-
tors, Inc. v. FTC, 475 F.2d 401, 402-03 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 828 (1973); Dultz v. FTC, 406 F.2d 227 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 936 (1969); Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313, 324-25
(8th Cir. 1965); Pati-Port, Inc. v. FTC, 313 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1963);
Standard Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1954).
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to perform on warranties is considered an unfair and deceptive
trade practice. '
THE MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act (Magnuson-Moss Act) creates a federal private
cause of action for breach of warranty obligations, which is in
addition to "any right or remedy of any consumer under State
law or any other Federal law."" An aggrieved consumer may re-
cover all litigation expenses, including attorneys' fees, in a success-
ful Magnuson-Moss action.' It is thus a significant piece of con-
sumer protection legislation at the federal level. An overview of
the Act will illustrate its obvious application in aircraft litigation.
The Magnuson-Moss Act requires that all written warranties on
consumer products costing more than ten dollars must be promi-
nently designated as either "full" warranties or "limited" warran-
ties.' If a manufacturer wants to market his product under a "full"
warranty, it must meet the following minimum standards under the
Act: (1) there must be no charge for repairing the product if
there is a defect or malfunction within the warranty period; (2)
implied warranties cannot be disclaimed or limited; (3) any exclu-
41 Failure to honor the terms of a guarantee or warranty is normally treated
as a breach of contract. The Federal Trade Commission, when faced with such
failures, has labeled them unfair and deceptive trade practices. In Infraglass
Heater Co., 55 F.T.C. 124 (1958), a distributor of electric water heaters was
charged with failing to honor the guarantee that it advertised would accompany
its products. The Commission ordered respondent to cease and desist from "repre-
senting, directly or by implication, that their electric heaters, or any other mer-
chandise, is guaranteed when any provision of the guarantee is not fully com-
plied with." Id. at 126. This failure to honor the guarantee was clearly an unfair
and deceptive trade practice.
In Excel Products, Inc., 61 F.T.C. 1119 (1962), a distributor of storm windows
and doors, aluminum and fiberglass awnings, carpets, and patio covers was repre-
senting in its advertisements that it "will make repairs or adjustments pursuant to
the terms of their guarantee." Id. at 1121. The complaint alleged that "[R]espond-
ents in many instances do not make repairs or adjustments in accordance with
their guarantee . . . [and the representations in their advertisements] are false,
misleading and deceptive." Id. at 1121. Respondents were ordered to cease and
desist from engaging in these unfair and deceptive trade practices.
4715 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (1976).
48 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (1976).
49 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (1976). Both full and limited warranties can be limited
to a stated duration, such as "full six-month warranty" or "limited three-year
warranty." Id.
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sion or limit on consequential economic damages for breach of
warranty must appear clearly and conspicuously on the face of
the warranty; and (4) if the product cannot be repaired after a
reasonable number of attempts, the consumer must be permitted to
elect either a replacement without charge, or a refund." By com-
parison, a "limited" warranty to a great extent can be tailored to
the desires of the manufacturer. For example, it might be a "parts
only" warranty under which the buyer must foot the bill for labor,
or it might be a "parts and labor" warranty without any right for
the buyer to obtain a replacement or refund. A manufacturer also
may use a "limited" warranty that requires the buyer to return the
defective product to the manufacturer or authorized dealer for
service at his own expense." The Act also contains an anti-tying
provision," which forces warrantors to supply the labor and parts
for warranty repair service free of charge if they wish to condi-
tion the warranty on the use of labor or parts that are designated
by brand name."
One of the most heralded aspects of the Magnuson-Moss Act
is its prohibition against disclaimers of implied warranty. In the
past, "boilerplate" in most written warranty forms contained a
paragraph which provided that the written warranty was "in lieu
of all other warranties, express or implied, including any warranty
of merchantability." Such a disclaimer of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) implied warranty of merchantability was valid under
the UCC so long as it was conspicuous." The authors of the Act,
however, regarded such a disclaimer as a deceptive practice and
drafted the Magnuson-Moss Act to make certain that "the fine
print shall no longer taketh away what the bold print giveth."
50 15 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976). In addition, the benefits of a "full warranty" auto-
matically extend to any second or subsequent purchasers during its duration.
15 U.S.C. 5 2304(b) (4). Nor may the full warrantor impose any "unreason-
able duties" on consumers as a condition of securing performance under the
warranty. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (1). The FrC has ruled, for example, that re-
quiring return of a registration card as a condition precedent of full warranty
coverage is an unreasonable duty. 16 C.F.R. § 700.7 (1979).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. S 2302(c), (e).
"The FTC may waive this provision if the manufacturer demonstrates that
the product will function properly only if the brand name parts or labor are
used. 15 U.S.C. S 2302(c).
-U.C.C. S 2-316.
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Thus, the statute provides that a seller who gives a written war-
ranty, or enters into a service contract within ninety days of any
sale, may not disclaim or modify any implied warranty to a con-
sumer with respect to that sale.' There are, however, two excep-
tions to this rule. First, a "limited" warranty may limit the duration
of any implied warranty to the duration of a written warranty,
so long as the duration is reasonable, conscionable, and set forth
in clear and unmistakable language on the face of the warranty."
Second, either a "full" or "limited" warranty may exclude liability
for consequential economic loss, so long as the exclusion appears
conspicuously on the face of the warranty."
The private action created by the Magnuson-Moss Act allows
a "consumer" to sue a "supplier, warrantor, or service contractor"
for breach of a written warranty, an implied warranty, a service
contract, or a violation of any obligations imposed by the Act.6
The Act defines "consumer" as a buyer or other qualified trans-
feree of a "consumer product."'" A "consumer product" is broadly
defined as "any tangible personal property which is distributed in
commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or
household purposes.""0 Under the FTC's interpretation of the Act,
even a small amount of "normal" consumer use makes the entire
product line subject to the Act. The FTC requires only that an
appreciable portion of a product class be sold for consumer pur-
poses." Thus, an airplane that is normally used for personal use
would be covered by the Act, even if it were purchased for busi-
ness use.
A necessary condition to the application of the Magnuson-Moss
Act is the existence of a written warranty as defined under the
15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1976).
N Id.
57 15 U.S.C. S§ 2304, 2308.
581d. § 2310(d)(1). A service contract is a written contract "to perform,
over a fixed period of time or for a specified duration, services relating to main-
tenance or repair" of a consumer product. Id. § 2301(8). Thus, the service
contract can be entered into before or after the sale of the product and need not
be part of the basis of the bargain.
69 Id. § 2301(3).
-Id. S 2301(1).
6142 Fed. Reg. 36,112, 36,115 (1977) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. 5
700.1(a)).
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Act. ' It is noteworthy that the Act's definition makes it unnecessary
to use formal words such as "warranty" or "guarantee" or to have
a "specific intention to make a warranty."'3 The Act does not,
however, include a provision that permits the creation of warran-
ties from a description of the goods or the use of a sample or
model." The Magnuson-Moss Act definition of written warranty
requires the sale of a consumer product to a buyer "for purposes
other than resale of such product."' The Act does not apply to
leases of goods, or to service transactions which do not involve the
sale of a consumer product.
In addition to giving the right to sue to consumers, the Act de-
fines "consumers" with sufficient breadth to overturn state law
doctrines of privity of contracts." It defines a consumer as "any
person to whom such [consumer] product is transferred during
the duration of an implied or written warranty,""' and all consumers
are given the right to sue for breach of warranty. The Magnuson-
Moss Act gives consumers a cause of action for breach of war-
ranty against a "supplier" as well as a "warrantor." A "supplier"
is "any person engaged in the business of making a consumer
product directly or indirectly available to consumers;" a "warran-
tor" is "any supplier or other person who gives or offers to give
a written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an implied
warranty."'3 It is possible, however, for a manufacturer to give an
express warranty to a distributor without having the warranty
extend to consumers. This is because Magnuson-Moss will not
apply to a written warranty unless it becomes part of the basis of
a bargain with a buyer who purchases for purposes other than
resale. Because a retailer buys for resale, a warranty that extends
only to the retailer is not within the ambit of the Magnuson-Moss
Act. Similarly, the supplier of a component part may safely give
a written warranty that is limited to the manufacturer."
"3See 15 U.S.C. S§ 2301(6), 2302-2304 (1976).
I3d.
Id.
'3 15 U.S.C. S 2301(6) (1976).
"Id. § 2301(3).
'6 Id.
681Id. § 2301(4), (5).
'342 Fed. Reg. 36,112, 36,116 (1977) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R.
700.3 (c)).
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Significantly, the Magnuson-Moss, Act gives consumers a cause
of action for breach of implied warranty."' Although the Act cre-
ates no implied warranties, it prohibits warrantors from disclaim-
ing implied warranties created under state law.' Warrantors using
a "full" warranty can neither limit the duration of nor disclaim
its implied warranty liability. For example, a manufacturer who
offers a one year "full" warranty on airplanes may not disclaim or
otherwise limit its liability for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability. Thus, if an implied warranty arises automatically
under the UCC with the sale of an airplane, it will be effective for
the full four years of the UCC's statute of limitations."
The Magnuson-Moss Act provides that consumers injured by
any breach of warranty or by certain statutory violations "may
bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief. .. ."
Successful litigants can recover costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees,
based on actual time expended, that have been reasonably in-
curred. A court, however, may deny an award of attorneys' fees
if it determines that such an award would be inappropriate." In
some cases, the Act contains specific remedies for violation of its
provisions. For example, if the warrantor improperly attempts to
disclaim liability for implied warranties, the disclaimer is invalid."
Similarly, if the warrantor under a "full" warranty fails to make
a conspicuous limitation of consequential damages, the limitation
is ineffective."0
Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, no private action for breach of
a written or implied warranty may be brought "unless the person
obligated under the warranty ... is afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to cure such failure to comply."" For purposes of the right
to cure, the Act does not distinguish between the rejection of
goods, revocation of acceptance, and damages for breach of war-
0 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(2), 2308 (1976). These provisions preempt state law,
so that an attempted disclaimer is invalid for purposes of both federal and state
law. Id. § 2308(c).
71 15 U.S.C. § 2308(c).
-
2 U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
78 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1976).
"1d. S 2310(d)(2).
5 Id. 5 2308.
71 Id. § 2304(a) (3).
77 Id. § 2310(e).
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ranty. When a consumer purchases a new product which imme-
diately malfunctions, the consumer may wish to resist the war-
rantor's offers to repair and insist that the defective product be
replaced. It is not clear whether Magnuson-Moss requires the
consumer to accept repair rather than replacement, since the Act
is silent as to what constitutes an effective cure."8
It is not clear whether the Act will cover personal injury cases.
The Act states that "[n]othing in this chapter (other than sections
2308 and 2304(a) (2) and (4) .. .) shall... affect the liability
of, or impose liability on, any person for personal injury. .. .
The sections excepted parenthetically, however, relate to implied
warranty coverage. The Magnuson-Moss Act apparently allows
recovery for personal injuries in a private action for breach of
implied warranty."M
The Federal Trade Commission Act, which is administered by
the FTC, does not provide for private actions by consumers,8 as
does the Magnuson-Moss Act. 2 The FTC, however, has adopted
a variety of rules to implement the Act. For example, FTC rules
govern disclosure by warrantors' and impose presale information
responsibilities on sellers." It is unclear whether a violation of
these rules gives rise to a private action.
STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES
In addition to the enforcement authority vested in the state
attorney general, many state consumer protection statutes allow
consumers to bring private actions to recover damages. The
mechanics of bringing such actions are illustrated by the follow-
ing discussion of the consumer protection statutes of several states
which allow private actions.
California
The California legislature's contribution to the consumer pro-
"'See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(10), 2304(a) (1976).
7915 U.S.C. S 2311(b)(2) (1976).
MId. § 2304(a)(3).
81 Alfred Dunhill v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974);
Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973).
8215 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1976).
83 16 C.F.R. § 701 (1979).
HId.
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tection bandwagon is the Consumers Legal Remedies Act
(CLRA).' The CLRA lists eighteen merchandising frauds " de-
rived from three phases of unfair competition: passing-off," mis-
representation of goods and services or their origins, 8 and decep-
tive advertising."8 The CLRA allows either an individual plaintiff
or a class of plaintiffs" to seek actual damages, injunctive relief
and punitive damages.8' Before these damage claims may be filed,
however, the plaintiff must notify the merchant and give him
thirty days to make repair or replacement that is appropriate."
The CLRA limitations period is three years. Prior to 1970, a
claimant was required to seek recovery for fraud; therefore, his
cause of action did not become legally cognizable until the decep-
8
s CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750-84 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979).
86 Id. § 1770.
87 Passing-off is the false representation to consumers that the goods or
services are those of another and is regulated by CAL. CIv. CODE § 1770(a)
(West Supp. 1979). See, e.g., Dixi-Cola Laboratories v. Coca-Cola Co., 117
F.2d 352 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 629 (1941). CAL. CiV. CODE §
1770(d) (West Supp. 1979) covers the misrepresentation of facts regarding geo-
graphic origin that can take the form of passing-off when geography and identity
are closely linked. See, e.g., Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co. v. Eagle, 86
F. 608 (7th Cir. 1898), cert. denied, 173 U.S. 703 (1899) (falsely representing
flour as Minnesota brand).
"CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1770(b)-(h), (o), (p), (r) (West Supp. 1979). Little
distinction can be made between subsections (b), (c), and the last phrase of (e).
They all prohibit the false representation by another of the sources, sponsorship
or certification of the product. Subsections (f) and (g) prohibit misrepresentation
of the quality or condition of goods or services. Subsection (h) forbids false
disparagement of a competitor. Subsection (o) proscribes any representation
that a good or service is needed when, in fact, it is not. Subsection (p) forbids
misrepresenting previous representations, and subsection (r) prohibits misrepre-
senting an agent's authority to negotiate final terms. Id.
891d. §§ 1770(i), (j), (m), (n), (q) (West Supp. 1979). Subsection (i) is
the old tort of deceit without the element of reliance; (j) and (m) are narrower
versions of (i), with exceptions added. Subsection (n) proscribes misrepresenting
consumers' rights and remedies. Subsection (q) is unique to the CLRA in for-
bidding the offer of an economic benefit which "is contingent on an event to
occur subsequent to the consummation of the transaction"; this language is
similar to CAL. CIV. CODE § 1803.10 (West 1973). In 1975, two new sections
were added which concern the advertising of unassembled furniture. Id.
1770(k)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
°Id. § 1781(a). Any consumer entitled to bring an action under section
1780 may, if the unlawful method, act, or practice has caused damage to other
consumers similarly situated, bring an action on behalf of himself and such
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tion was discovered.' All claims under the CLRA, however,
accrue the day the act is committed, regardless of when a prudent
man might uncover a fraud."
Florida
The Florida consumer protection statute (Florida Act) is broad
enough to apply to almost any activity in the marketplace, includ-
ing antitrust matters and restraint of trade activities." It allows
an individual to bring an action for declaratory relief, injunctive
relief, or damages against all alleged violators of the Act." To en-
courage such civil action by citizens and to protect businessmen
from the expense of defending against frivolous lawsuits, the
Florida Act allows the prevailing party in a private action to
recoup costs and attorneys' fees."7 Although the Act prohibits pri-
vate class actions, it does allow the enforcing authority to bring
a "class action" on behalf of consumers."
A private action may be based upon a violation of any provi-
sion of the Act or a violation of any rule promulgated pursuant
to the Act." Section 501.204 of the Florida Act prohibits any
"unfair" or "deceptive" act, and relies upon sixty years of interpre-
tations of the FTCA by federal courts and the FTC for a precise
definition of those terms. There are, however, limitations upon
liability for violations of the Act. For example, a person engaging
in an "unfair" or "deceptive" act is liable only for damages directly
related to the "unfair" or "deceptive" activity, and not for conse-
quential damages.'"
Georgia
In 1975, the Georgia Legislature adopted the Fair Business
"9 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(4) (West 1973).
4CAL. CIV. CODE § 1783 (West 1973).
9 5 FLA. STAT. 5 501.011 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
"Id. § 501.211.
97Id. § 501.211(2). This section directs the trial judge in his discretion to
award the prevailing party attorneys' fees and costs based upon the attorney's
actual work on the case; attorneys' fees and costs are recoverable against a re-
tailer, however, only if the retailer acted in bad faith and with actual knowledge
of the falsity of the claim of the manufacturer or wholesaler which he was
discussing.
9"ld. § 501.207(1)(c).
-1d. § 501.203(5) (Supp. 1979).
1-Id. § 501.212(3) (Supp. 1979).
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Practices Act of 1975 (FBPA). '* The FBPA utilizes! a modified
version of the definition of "deceptive trade practices" contained
in the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act"' and proscribes
the twelve specific practices as does the UDTPA after which it
was modeled." The beginning section of the FBPA states,: "(a)
Unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of con-
sumer transactions and consumer acts or practices in trade or
commerce'0 are hereby declared unlawful.""' Since the FBPA
incorporates the Federal Trade Commission Act by reference,
federal court and FTC interpretations of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act can be used to determine the meaning of "unlawful
practices." The beginning section of the FBPA also states: "(b)
By way of illustration only and without limiting the scope of sub-
section (a), the following practices are hereby declared unlaw-
ful" and lists the first eleven practices of the UDTPA with two
changes."
The Act provides for both administrative and private remedies.
A private suit for injunctive relief is allowed, and general damages
are allowed under the liberalized definition of "deceptive prac-
tices.' '... The requirement of scienter is no longer necessary for
recovery of general damages or attorneys' fees,"8 but, if an inten-
tional violation is established, a court may award up to three times
the actual damages." The Act also provides that "[i]f [a] court
finds the action continued past the rejection of [a] reasonable writ-
ten offer of settlement in bad faith or for the purposes of harass-
ment, the court shall award attorneys' fees and expenses of liti-
"' GA. CODE ANN. § 106-1201-1217 (Supp. 1979).
a°-Id. § 106-1203(b).
1o3 Id.
"04 "Trade" and "commerce" mean the advertising, distribution, sales, lease or
offering for distribution, sale or lease, of any goods, services or any property,
tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, commodity,
anything of value wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce
directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state. Id. § 106-1202(c). "Con-
sumer acts or practices" includes acts or practices intended to encourage con-




"0Id. § 106-1210(a), (d).
"0Id. § 106-1210(c).
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gation to the adverse party.." Retailers who are sued under the
Act because of actions by their suppliers can file a claim against
them for indemnity."' Furthermore, the Act provides that if the
injury resulted from an error occurring through no fault of the




Ohio has adopted a version of the Uniform Consumer Sales
Practices Act, the statute promulgated by the Uniform Law Com-
missioners." The Ohio Act"' changes the substantive law of fraud,
deception, and unconscionability relevant to "consumer transac-
tions.""' It provides for individual, class action, and publicly en-
forced remedies, along with remedies which combine individual
and public elements. An individual consumer can maintain an
action for rescission of a contract,"' actual damages,"7 a declara-
tory judgment,"8 or injunctive relief."' An individual consumer can
also collect a minimum of $200 in lieu of actual damages." Con-
sumers may bring class actions under the Act for violations of Ohio
Commerce Department rules, and for practices which an Ohio
court has determined to be violations of sections 1345.02 or
1345.03 of the Act."' The relief in such a class action, how-
11d. § 106-1210(d).
"' Id. § 106-1210(e).
"1 Id. S 106-1211.
"' Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1978).
11OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01-1345.99 (Page 1979).
"' " 'Consumer transaction' means a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance,
or other transfer of an item of goods, a service, franchise, or an intangible ...
to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household,
or solicitation to supply any of these things." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01 (A)
(Page 1979). However, transactions between consumers and the utilities specified
in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.03 (Page 1973) (i.e., telephone companies,
electric companies, and water companies) are excluded from coverage, as are
dealings with the financial institutions and insurance companies described in
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5725.01 (Page 1973), along with attorney-client and
physician-patient transactions. Id. § 1345.01(A) (Page 1979).
" Id. 5 1345.09(A) (Page 1979).
1" Id.
"18 Id. § 1345.09(D).
11 Id.
120 Id. S 1345.09(B).
12 Id.
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ever, is limited to actual damages; the $100 minimum damage
amount is not available in a class suit. 2'
The Act forbids both "deceptive acts or practices""1 3 and "un-
conscionable acts or practices""' in consumer transactions. Section
1345.02 of the Act lists a series" of "deceptive" practices and
proof of the commission of one of these practices establishes a
violation of the Act. The specific practices described in section
1345.02 are illustrative and do not exhaust the category of pro-
hibited deceptive practices. On the other hand, section 1345.03,




"'OHio REV. CODE ANN. 5 1345.02(B), (C) (Page 1979) provides as
follows:
(B) Without limiting the scope of division (A) of this section,
the act or practice of a supplier in representing any of the following
is deceptive.
(1) That the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship,
approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits
it does not have;
(2) That the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular
standard, quality, grade, prescription, or model, if it is not;
(3) That the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or un-
used, if it is not;
(4) That the subject of a consumer transaction is available to the
consumer for a reason that does not exist;
(5) That the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied
in accordance with a previous representation, if it has not, except
that the act of a supplier in furnishing similar merchandise of equal
or greater value as a good faith substitute does not violate this
section;
(6) That the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied
in greater quantity than the supplier intends;
(7) That replacement or repair is needed, if it is not;
(8) That a specific price advantage exists, if it does not;
(9) That the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation
he does not have;
(10) That a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a
warranty, a disclaimer of warranties or other rights, remedies or
obligations if the representation is false.
(C) No supplier shall offer to the consumer or represent that a
consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other benefit as an in-
ducement for entering into a consumer transaction in return for
giving the supplier the names of prospective consumers, or other-
wise helping the supplier to enter into other consumer transactions,
if earning the benefit is contingent upon an event occurring after
the consumer enters into the transaction.
"Id. § 1345.03(B) provides as follows:
(B) In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable,
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methods but makes proof of a supplier's use of such methods only
one circumstance to be taken into consideration in determining
whether his conduct is unconscionable. Proof of knowledge by
the supplier, however, is required.
The deceptive sales techniques which the Act prohibits include
misrepresentations incorporated into sales pitches and deliberate
schemes to defraud. Misrepresentations as to the quality,"' dura-
bility,28 age,"8 or endorsemente" of the product offered are for-
bidden. Premeditated techniques which are prohibited are false
fire sales,"' referral sales schemes,"' and bait-and-switch adver-
tising."' Post-sale protection is also afforded." Assurances given
in reaction to consumer complaints, and threats made to stifle
complaints, can constitute violations.
The Director of Commerce is empowered to promulgate de-
tailed substantive rules defining deceptive trade practices which
the following circumstances shall be taken into consideration:
(1) Whether the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the
inability of the consumer reasonably to protect his interests because
of his physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability
to understand the language of an agreement;
(2) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer trans-
action was entered into that the price was substantially in excess
of the price at which similar property or services were readily ob-
tainable in similar consumer transactions by like consumers;
(3) Whether the supplier knew at the time the transaction was
entered into the inability of the consumer to receive a substantial
benefit from the subject of the consumer transaction;
(4) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer trans-
action was entered into that there was no reasonable probability
of payment of the obligation in full by the consumer;
(5) Whether the supplier required the consumer to enter into a
consumer transaction on terms the supplier knew were substantially
one-sided in favor of the supplier;
(6) Whether the supplier knowingly made a misleading statement
of opinion on which the consumer was likely to rely to his detri-
ment.




131 Id. § 1345.02(B)(4); Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act § 3(b)(4),
Commissioner's Comment, 7A U.L.A. 8 (1978).
13 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(C) (Page 1979).
133Id. S 1345.02(B)(6); Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act § 3(b)(6),
Commissioner's Comment, 7A U.L.A. 8 (1978).
"'Onio REv. CODE ANN. §S 1345.02(A), 1345.03(A) (Page 1979).
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constitute violations of section 1345.02." One such rule makes
prior statements germane to the commission of a deceptive act.
Hence, even if the parol evidence rule otherwise would have
prevented the substantive content of such prior statements from
being made a part of the consumer-supplier agreement, and
thereby precluded the consumer from holding the supplier to
the fulfillment of pre-sale statements and promises, the consumer
can nevertheless offer proof of such statements in the demonstra-
tion of a deceptive practice." As a result, the parol evidence rule
is rendered irrelevant.
Oregon
In 1971, the Oregon legislature enacted the Unlawful Trade
Practices Act (UTPA), which gives to consumers both public and
private remedies against specific unlawful business practices. 3
In order to prevail in a private action brought under the UTPA,
however, a consumer must show by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice,
or introduce proof of any prior injunction, final judgment, or
court order issued pursuant to the public enforcement portion of
the UTPA, as, prima facie proof of a violation of the Act.'8
The UTPA does not require the plaintiff to prove intent or
reliance as is required in common law fraud. He need only show
conduct by the defendant which the defendant knew or should
have known was a violation of the Act.'" Plaintiff, moreover, is
entitled to file additional separate counts in fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, and breach of warranty. '40 The statute of limitations period
is one year and is tolled from the date of the discovery of the
"I Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(B) (Page 1979). See also id. ch. 119.
'"See Sparhawk v. Gorham, 101 Ohio App. 362, 139 N.E.2d 652 (1956).
137 0R. REV. STAT. §§ 646.605-646.656 (1977).
"3 "A willful violation occurs when the person committing the violation knew
or should have known that his conduct was a violation." Id. § 646.605(8).
I-id. § 646.638(1).
140 Id. § 646.656. The action may be brought in the form of a counterclaim
against the seller or lessor as well. Id. § 646.638(6). The Oregon Supreme
Court considered but failed to decide the issue of whether OR. REV. STAT. §
646.656 allows the combination of a suit in equity for rescission of a contract
with an action at law for damages. Sherrod v. Holzshuh, 274 Or. 327, 330-31,
546 P.2d 470, 472 (1976).
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unlawful practice. " ' The UTPA provides that an injured consumer
may sue to recover actual damages or $200, whichever is greater."
The plaintiff need not allege or prove the amount of actual loss
in an action to recover the statutory minimum of $200; the actual
amount of loss is held immaterial to the recovery.' The plaintiff
may also request an award of punitive damages along with equit-
able relief' and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs."'
The plaintiff in a consumer action need not show a "willful
and malicious" misrepresentation by the defendant in order to
receive punitive damages. In Allen v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc.,'"
the Oregon Supreme Court held that punitive damages are justi-
fied if the conduct of the defendant is such that it should be de-
terred.' In that case, the court held that evidence showing
a "deliberate and calculated effort to misrepresent the facts" sur-
rounding the specific transaction was sufficient to justify the im-
position of punitive damages. "' Nevertheless, the requirement of
"reasonable proportionality" may not be applied. One Oregon
court, for example, allowed each plaintiff to seek actual damages
of $34.95 and punitive damages of $250,000. "'
Texas
Texas adopted in 1975, and amended in September 1977 and
in August 1979, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)."*
Because the 1977 and 1979 amendments to the DTPA are not
retroactive, and because each amendment makes substantial
changes to the Act, a consumer contemplating suit under the Act
141 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(5) (1977). The limitation period is suspended
from running when a public enforcement suit is filed under section 646.632(1)
by the local district attorney or the attorney general. Id.
142Id. § 646.638(1).
14 Scott v. Western Int'l Surplus Sales, Inc., 267 Or. 512, 517 P.2d 661 (1973).
'44OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(1) (1977).
1-1d. § 646.638(3).
146273 Or. 614, 542 P.2d 896 (1975).
'47Id. at 616, 542 P.2d at 898.
148 Id.
"'Jeffries v. Doe, Civ. No. 78685 (Cir. Ct. Marion County, Or. Nov. 23,
1973), originally filed as Civ. No. 72-2506 (Cir. Ct. Lane County, Or.); David
v. Doe, Civ. No. 78672 (Cir. Ct. Marion County, Or. Nov. 14, 1973), originally
filed as Civ. No. 72-2898 (Cir. Ct. Lane County, Or.).
'
7 0 TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § § 17.41-17.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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should carefully review the amendments which apply to his cause
of action. Generally, however, the DTPA allows any consumer
who has been adversely affected by a deceptive or misleading
practice to maintain a private action for treble damages and attor-
neys' fees." The Act covers deceptive or misleading acts relating
to services and repairs as well as to goods;" ' both business" and
personal uses of goods are covered by the Act."' The DTPA pro-
vides a cause of action for any consumer who is adversely affected
by "the use or employment of any person of an act or practice
declared to be unlawful by Section 17.46." Section 17.46(a)
declares unlawful any "[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Section
17.46(b) then defines "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or
practices" to include twenty-two specific items of conduct, com-
monly referred to as the "laundry list."
An act or practice not listed in the "laundry list" of section
17.46(b) is "false, misleading or deceptive," and hence unlawful
under section 17.46(a), if it has the capacity or tendency to de-
ceive; actual deception is not required." In determining capacity
and tendency to deceive, consideration is given to the impact of
the representation on the "ignorant, the unthinking and the credu-
lous. '".. This standard was specifically articulated by the Supreme
Court of Texas in the case of Spradling v. Williams."' "The law
is not made for the protection of experts, but for the public, that
vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and
the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze,
but are governed by appearances and general impressions."'
"' Id. § 17.50. The amendments effective August 29, 1979, limit the treble
damages recovery to $1,000. Id.
1521d. § 17.45, 17.46.
Z3 Id.
" Id. S 17.46. The Act outlines five separate categories of unlawful conduct:
(1) false, misleading or deceptive acts or practices; (2) a laundry list of prac-
tices which are considered deceptive per se; (3) breach of an express or implied
warranty; (4) any unconscionable action or course of action; and (5) deceptive
or misleading practices in the insurance business, as defined by rules and regu-
lations issued by the Texas State Board of Insurance. Id.
11 FTC v. Hires Turner Glzss Co., 81 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1935).
1" Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978).
157 Id. at 563.
18 Id.
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Furthermore, evidence of intent to deceive or intent to violate
the law is not required to prove that conduct is "false, misleading,
or deceptive."....
Unlike the other state statutes previously discussed, the DTPA
mandates the imposition of punitive damages'" unless the defend-
ant has availed himself of one of the three enumerated defenses:
(1) bona fide error; (2) defendant did not receive written notice,
or, if he did receive notice, he tendered plaintiff's damages, in-
cluding attorneys' fees; and (3) for breach of warranty, defend-
ant was not given a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect be-
fore suit was filed.' Like several state statutes mentioned previ-
ously, however, the DTPA requires that FTC and federal court
interpretations of the FTCA be used for guidance in determining
whether specific conduct constitutes a false, misleading or decep-
tive act."' In actions by consumers for damages, as opposed to
actions by the attorney general, only court decisions are to be
used for guidance.'"
The Uniform Cbmmercial Code permits the disclaimer of
warranties and the limitation or modification of remedies."' The
DTPA, however, provides that "[a]ny waiver by a consumer of
the provisions of this subchapter is contrary to public policy and
is unenforceable and void."'' The question raised by this provision
is whether this "no waiver" clause negates exclusions and limita-
tions in a warranty which were heretofore allowed under the
UCC. One commentator has suggested that "[i]f Section 2.316 is
complied with, no warranty ever arises and, therefore, there is
no remedy provided by the Act which the consumer could waive.'"
Whether sections 2-718 and 2-719 of the UCC, which permit limi-
tation or modification of remedies, conflict with the Act's "no
waiver" provision is still an open question. These sections provide
"' State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, 530 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex. 1975).
160 Littleton v. Woods, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977).
'e TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
'"Id. § 17.46(c) (2); Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. 1978).
"' 566 S.W.2d at 562 n.1.
'eU.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-718, 2-719.
1 TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
' Note, Implied Warranties: Can They Still Be Waived in Texas, 26 BAYLOR
L. REv. 440, 448 (1974).
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for limitation or modification of remedies for breach of a warranty
that has not been disclaimed. There appears to be no way to
reconcile these provisions with the "no waiver" provision in many
consumer transactions. For example, any attempt by the seller to
limit the consumer's recovery to actual damages would apparently
be void, since the Act entitles the consumer to seek "three times
[his] actual damages." Moreover, any attempt to limit the con-
sumer's remedy for breach of warranty to repair and replacement,
which is permissible under section 2-719 of the UCC, may be
void under the "no waiver" provision, since such a limitation of
remedies would impair the injured consumer's statutory right to
seek any or all of the remedies listed in section 17.50(b) of the
Act.
One of the interesting aspects of the Act is that it expressly in-
cludes the insurance industry in its coverage. A consumer is en-
titled to sue under the DTPA where he has been adversely affected
by "an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive
act or practice in the business of insurance. 16. Among other things,
the Act prohibits misrepresentations with respect to the terms or
benefits of any policy, 6" as well as untrue, deceptive, or misleading
information and advertising."" In addition to providing a cause of
action under the DTPA for violations of the State Insurance Code,
the legislature also provided in the Insurance Code itself a private
cause of action for violations of rules or regulations of the State
Board of Insurance issued under article 21.21 of the Insurance
Code or any practice prohibited by section 17.46 of the DTPA.1'
The result of providing a private cause of action under article
21.21 of the Insurance Code for violations of section 17.46 of
the DTPA is' that the entire "laundry list" contained in section
17.46 (b) of the DTPA, as well as the section 17.46 (a) "catch-all"
prohibition, are now incorporated into article 21.21 of the Insur-
ance Code itself.
The major difference between the aforementioned private causes
of action is that in article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, the legis-
lature did not limit the class of plaintiffs who can sue to "con-
1 6 7 T. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 3 (Vernon 1963).
:
61 8d. 5 4(l).
"6 Id. § 4(2).
'"TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1979).
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sumers." Rather, section 16 of article 21.21 allows an action by
"any person who has been injured by another's engaging in any
of the practices declared [unlawful] ..'". "Person" is broadly de-
fined as "any individual, corporation, association, partnership, re-
ciprocal exchange, inter-insurer, Lloyds insurer, fraternal benefit
society, and any other legal entity engaged in the business of
insurance, including agents, brokers, adjusters and life insurance
counselors. '' ...
Private causes of action under both the Insurance Code and
the DTPA may be maintained for violations of rules or regula-
tions issued under article 21.21 by the State Board of Insurance
as well as for violations of article 21.21 itself." The State Board
of Insurance, in 1971, issued rules and regulations concerning
insurance trade practices, advertising, and solicitation." The most
significant section of these rules and regulations provides as follows:
No person shall engage in this State in any trade practice that is
a misrepresentation of an insurance policy, that is an unfair method
of competition or that is an unfair or deceptive act or practice as
defined by the provisions of the Insurance Code of Texas or as
defined by these and other Rules and Regulations of the State
Board of Insurance.1
7 5
"' d. 5 16(9). Compare id. art. 21.21, § 16(a) with TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE
ANN. S 17.50(9) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
1'TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 2(a).
73Id. § 16(a).
"7 Texas State Board of Insurance, Regulation in Respect of Insurance Trade
Practices, Advertising and Solicitations, Docket No. 18663 (Dec. 3, 1971).
Copies are available from the State Board of Insurance, Austin, Texas. Note
that section 1 makes these rules and regulations applicable to "insurers and insur-
ance agents and other persons in their conduct of the business of insurance or in
connection therewith, whether done directly or indirectly and irrespective of
whether the person is active as insurer, principal, agent, employer, or employee,
or in other capacity or connection with such insurer."
I id. The term "misrepresentation" is expressly defined as follows:
Sec. 5. MISREPRESENTATION DEFINED. STANDARDS FOR
DETERMINING MISREPRESENTATION. The term misrepre-
sentation of the prohibited conduct, act or practice that constitutes
misrepresentation by a person subject to the provisions of this
regulation, is defined as any one of the following acts or omissions:
(a) any untrue statement of a material fact; or
(b) any omission to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made (considered in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made) not misleading; or
(c) the making of any statement in such manner or order as to
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The regulations of the State Board of Insurance also direct the
Commissioner of Insurance to issue interpretations and guidelines
to aid in the administration and enforcement of the Board regula-
tions.7' The Commissioner of Insurance, by official order, issued
such guidelines in 19712" It is unclear whether violation of the
provisions of these guidelines constitutes a violation of "rules and
regulations" of the State Board of Insurance. If the Commissioner's
order containing these guidelines carries the force of a Board rule
or regulation, then a private cause of action arises under the DTPA
and under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code when any act or
practice violates the guidelines. At a minimum, the guidelines are
strongly persuasive in determining what acts or practices constitute




In 1961, the state legislature enacted the Washington Consumer
Protection Act (WCPA) . 1 ' The Act provided Washington's con-
sumers, acting through their state attorney general, with an ad-
ministrative remedy for unfair or deceptive practices employed by
the business community in the conduct of trade or commerce.'
The Act was amended in 1970 to give Washington consumers the
mislead a reasonably prudent person to a false conclusion of a
material fact; or
(d) any material misstatement of law; or
(e) any failure to disclose any matter required by law to be dis-
closed, including failure to make disclosure in accordance with
the provisions of these and other applicable regulations of the
State Board of Insurance.
Id. S 5. This rule effectively requires a finding that the misrepresentation com-
plained of be material.
176 Texas State Board of Insurance, Regulation in Respect of Insurance Trade
Practices, Advertising and Solicitations, Docket No. 18663, § 7 (Dec. 3, 1971).
17 Texas State Board of Insurance, Regulation of Insurance Trade Practices,
Advertising and Solicitation, Docket No. 35848 (Dec. 21, 1971).
178 Cf. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980), which
directs the courts to look to FTC and federal court interpretations of section
5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976),
in construing section 17.46(a) of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
171 WAsH. REV. CODE §5 19.86.0'10-19.86.920 (1978).
'8WAsH. REV. CODE 5 19.86.020 (1978) provides: "Unfair methods of com-
petition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared unlawful."
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right to bring a private action for damages8 and to obtain treble
damages and attorneys' fees.18'
The Washington Supreme Court formulated the concept of the
"cper se" violation, in 1972, holding that the infringement of any
law designed to protect the public is "per se" an unfair or decep-
tive practice condemned by the WCPA.'" In 1973, the court
continued its liberal construction of the Act in Hockley v. Hargitt'"
by allowing the plaintiff to enjoin future violations of the WCPA.
In 1975, however, the court in Johnston v. Beneficial Management
Corp. '8 declared that the words "unfair act or practice," as used
in the statute, are not actionable unless, the affirmative and de-
ceitful actions are designed to effect a sale.' The court observed
that the state legislature had modeled the WCPA after the Federal
Trade Commission Act."' Since all the cases decided under the
FTCA concern affirmative acts designed to effect a sale,' the court
concluded that actionable conduct, pursuant to the Act, must
also involve actions designed to effect a sale.""9
18 Id. 5 19.86.090, formerly ch. 216, S 9 [1961] Wash. Sess. Laws 1958,
granted each citizen the right to bring a private action for damages resulting from
unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
.. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1978) provides for treble damages to be
awarded by the court in its discretion, provided the increased award does not
exceed one thousand dollars.
181State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972).
1882 Wash. 2d 337, 510 P.2d 1123 (1973).
's' 85 Wash. 2d 637, 538 P.2d 510 (1975).
1Id. at 643, 538 P.2d at 515. The basis of the action arose from the
allegations that the seller, National Appliance Company, used high pressure
sales tactics to induce the buyer to purchase a vacuum cleaner and a membership
in a "family buying power plan" and grossly misrepresented the value of both.
It was alleged that the finance company, National Finance Corporation, knew of
the seller's deceitful practices before the contracts were purchased and that it
made a profit from those transactions.
The court dismissed the plaintiff's contentions that Nationwide Finance Cor-
poration's (assignee of the contracts purchased by National Finance Corporation)
offer to make additional loans under the contract constituted an unfair act. The
court reasoned that the alleged offer did not unfairly induce a purchase and the
words "unfair act or practice" are not actionable unless the deceitful actions were
designed to effect a sale.
187 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1977).
181 85 Wash. 2d at 643, 538 P.2d at 515.
18 Id. at 643-44, 538 P.2d at 515.
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CONCLUSION
Although the facts of each case must be carefully analyzed to
determine the applicability of state and federal consumer protec-
tion statutes, it is apparent that these laws can have a significant
impact on aviation litigation. The additional remedies of attorneys'
fees and punitive damages, together with expanded conceptions
of what constitutes relevant and material evidence, should provide
sufficient incentive to the plaintiffs' bar to make increasing use
of the consumer protection statutes in aviation litigation.
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